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J E W I S H D E P O R T A T I O N S 
IN C A R P A T H O - R U T H E N I A IN 1944 
Today we know a great deal, although certainly not enough, of what happened in 
1944 to the Jews who lived in Carpatho-Ruthenia*. As both György Ránki and Randolph 
L. Braham, following Jenő Lévai's work, have concluded, at the time immediately after 
19 March 1944, neither the Germans nor the government of Döme Sztójay had a detailed 
plan for the fate of Hungary's Jewry. 
In this respect, three circumstances deserve special attention: 1. Unlike in Western 
European countries, for example, Hungary at this time had a relatively large number of 
Jews compared to the total population. 
2. Their fate was gravely influenced by the unfolding military situation. 
3. Closely related to this was the fact that the Germans could not afford to release 
significant forces for this task, as is shown by the relatively small size of the Adolf 
Eichmann Sonderkommando. 
In these circumstances, a lot depended on the attitude of the Hungarian authorities 
toward the „Jewish question." Miklós Horthy decided to withdraw, giving free hand to the 
Sztójay government in this matter as well. The Parliament was suspended, the government 
ruled by decree, thus Miklós Horthy was spared even signing the orders for the systematic 
robbing, internment in ghettos or collection camps, and the eventual deportation of several 
hundred thousand Hungarian citizens.1 
How ill-prepared this operation was, how it lacked a coordinated central command 
is born out by the papers of the Government's Commissioner's Office in Carpatho-Ruthenia 
for the year 1944. To date, researchers have made little use of these documents. We have 
known that barely a week after the occupation of Hungary the German authorities declared 
all Hungarian territories east of the river Tisza to be military zones under German 
jurisdiction, effective immediately.2 At first the occupiers treated the Hungarian army with 
distrust, companies were surrounded and confined to their barracks; furthermore, the Tisza 
served as a military demarcation. On 26 March, Miklós Horthy had already asked for the 
* [Carpatho-Ruthenia (Ka'rpátalja), NE Hungary at the time, now in Ukraine.] 
1 GYÖRGY RÁNKI: 1944. március 19. Budapest 1968., pp. 157—159 
2 Veesenmayer's report of 25 March 1944 to the German Foreign Ministry. (In: A Wilhelmstrasse és 
Magyarország. Német diplomáciai iratok Magyarországról 1933—1944. (Wilhelmstrasse and Hungary. German 
Diplomatic papers from Hungary, 1933—1944.)—hereinafter: Wilhelmstrasse — Eds.: GY. RÁNKI, E. PAMLÉNYI, 
L. TlLKOVSZKY, and G Y . JUHÁSZ. B u d a p e s t 1 9 6 8 , p . 8 0 0 . ) 
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lifting of the cordon, claiming that all communications with the eastern half of the country 
had been disrupted.3 
The old regent had both the opportunity and the power to shunt aside the Germans' 
original candidate, Béla Imrédy, and appoint his own man (or so he thought), Hungary's 
former ambassador to Berlin, Sztójay, as Prime Minister. The Third Reich's plenipotentiary 
in Hungary received his instructions directly from Adolf Hitler: 
„...see to it that the country's administration — including the time during which 
German troops are stationed there — is carried out by a government under his direction, 
with the purpose of maximum utilization of the country's resources, first of all its economic 
capabilities, for our mutual strategic goals." 
Further, Hitler informed his Hungarian deputy: 
„For the purpose of carrying out the tasks in Hungary by the SS and the Police 
with the help of German forces - PRIMARILY POLICE MATTERS RELEVANT TO 
THE JEWISH QUESTION (my emphasis—L.K.) - a Higher SS and Police Leader will 
be assigned to the staff of the Reich's plenipotentiary, who WILL CARRY OUT THE 
POLITICAL INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PLENIPOTENTIAR." (my emphasis — L.K.)4 
The final solution of the Hungarian Jewish problem is very significant, as German 
Foreign Minister Joachim Ribbentrop informed all his subordinates who served abroad, 
preparing them for possible official protests by representatives of neutral countries. 
According to Ribbentrop, the Western powers in Hungary, relying on influential Jewish and 
certain other circles, were trying to create a „defeatist anti-Axis attitude." „It is well known 
that a certain portion of the Hungarian press etc., has already fallen victim to this 
influence", Joachim Ribbentrop remarked.5 
The concern of the German authorities proved to be groundless. On 31 March, 
Edmund Veesenmayer wrote in his report, some what surprised, that the Hungarian 
government with its latest regulations, „...has proved that it has taken seriously the solution 
of this question (i.e. the Jewish question — L.K.) ACCORDING TO OUR 
INTERPRETATION (my emphasis — L.K.). Considering local conditions, this 
development may be called unusually rapid."6 
The hierarchical order seemed to work: Edmund Veesenmayer directed the 
government of Hungary and Döme Sztójay was accommodating; his enthusiasm was 
surpassed only by that of László Baky and László Endre, the two newly-appointed under-
secretaries of the Ministry of the Interior who „turn night into day" as they „labor" — 
according to their own admission, too — on the solution of the Jewish question. 
It seemed, however, that the first Jewish decrees did not satisfy all expectations 
that sooner or later all Jews would indeed be removed from Hungary. In the National 
3 Veesenmayer's telegram of 26 March 1944 to Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister. (Wilhelmsirasse, pp. 
8 0 3 - 8 0 4 . ) 
4 Veesenmayer's certificate of appointment, 20 March 1944. (Wilhelmstrasse, p. 789.) 
5 Ribbentrop's conference-telegram of 22 March 1944 to all German foreign missions. (Withelmsirasse, p. 
793.) 
6 Veesenmayer's report of 31 March 1944 to Ribbentrop. (Wilhelmsirasse, p. 907.) 
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Archives I have found traces of hitherto unknown plans for operations against the Jews 
worked out by lower levels of the German and Hungarian authorities. It is possible that we 
are dealing only with the private actions of an overenthusiastic clerk. 
On 1 April 1944, the commander of the German SS in Kassa sent the following 
request to the local commander of the gendarmerie: 
„In light of the special situation in the territory of Kárpát-Ukrajna, we request that 
Jews from the villages in this territory be resettled in the cities of Munkács, Ungvár and 
Beregszász, already secured by the police and the Gendarmerie. Within the next five to six 
days Huszt will also be secured, and at that time it, too, will be ready for the same 
purpose."7 
The SS Major's request was received with sympathy. The very next day, at 11 
o'clock in the morning of 2 April, Gend. Col. Győző Tölgyesy, commander of the VIHth 
Gendarmerie District (most of the Felvidék*0* and Carpatho-Ruthenia belonged to this 
district) contacted Géza Halász, advisor to the Ministry of the Interior and assistant head 
of the Government's commission in Carpatho-Ruthenia. Not only did Győző Tölgyesy 
enthusiastically endorse the SS Major's request, he also added one of his own suggestions: 
In addition to the cities mentioned above, „Huszt and Nagyszőlős could also be used for 
the purpose of resettlement." Gend. Col. Győző Tölgyesy was obviously aware that nearly 
200.000 people were about to be transferred and/or taken away to ghettos or collection 
camps, and so he made further proposals. He set the deadline for gathering the Jews for 
6 April and suggested a rather simple mode of accomplishing it: he raised the possibility 
of „administratively" asking the Jews to „resettle." In other words: the Jews should place 
themselves into ghettos...8 More precisely, the Colonel meant to resettle only those who 
may have been left behind after the expiration of the deadline. 
The most interesting fact in this whole matter is the reaction of the highest officials 
in the Ministry of the Interior. Halász telephoned Gend. Col. Gyula Király, head of the 
VII. Public Security Department of the Ministry of the Interior who returned the call on 
the same day, at noon on 2 April and told Halász that at the instruction of the Minister of 
the Interior „the request is to be granted."9 
Neither the Minister of the Interior, Andor Jaross, nor Géza Halász or Győző 
Tölgyesy bothered about the fact that at this time no law or decree prescribed the 
segregation or confinement of Jews in ghettos or internment camps. One SS major snapped 
his finger and within twenty-four hours Hungary's Minister of the Interior agreed to the 
forced removal of nearly 200.000 Hungarian citizens. 
7 Országos Levéltár (National Archives) — hereinafter: OL Kárpátaljai Kormányzói Biztos Hivatalának iratai 
(Papers of the Office of the Kárpátalja Government Commissioner) — hereinafter: KKBH.i. — K 774—1944, p. 
3. Statement of the SS and SD company commander on duty in Kassa, dated 1 April 1944, to lst.Lt. Kökcndy, 
District Commissioner of the Gendarmerie. 
"(Upper Province, i.e. today's Slovakia) 
* OL, ibid. Protocol, Ungvár, 2 April 1944, signed by Géza Halász. 
v OL, ibid. 
This operation failed in the end. Brigadier General Zoltán Algya Papp discussed 
the German major's request with leaders of the 1st Hungarian Army assigned to the 
Carpatho-Ruthenia district, and on the same day, at four in the afternoon, conveyed the 
following to Halász: 
„...the transfer of Jews would seriously impede the army's deployment, now in 
progress, especially in counties along the border; further, in Munkács our headquarters and 
attached units are in need of every available accommodation, therefore the resettled Jews 
could not be directed there."10 
Officials of the Ministry of Defense in Budapest must also have protested, because 
two days later on 4 April, Gend. Col. Király repeatedly telephoned Halász (it is remarkable 
that in these fateful days and weeks, the same bureaucrats, usually such sticklers for 
formalities, issuing and demanding written documents complete with stamps and signatures, 
so easily and enthusiastically switched to informal transactions), and said: 
„...according to German authorities in Budapest, Jews in the border region of 
Kárpátalja may be removed only with the agreement of the army command there, while the 
removal of all the Jews of Kárpátalja, i.e. for a larger scale resettlement (sic!) the consent 
of the German Central Command in Budapest is necassary."11 
The „rounding up" of the Jews, to use a contemporary terminology, began at down 
on 15 April 1944. The mere facts were summarized the following way in the above-
mentioned document: 
„The Jews gathered together, approximately 195.000 persons, were placed in the 
collection camps set up in Munkács, Ungvár, Vaijúlápos, and Beregszász, and in the 
designated ghettos of Huszt, Máramarossziget, Kassa, Mátészalka, Nyíregyháza, 
Nagyszőlős, Sátoraljaújhely, Kisvárda, and Beregszász. The amount of the money collected 
and the worth of jewelry and other valuables are unknown."12 
With brutal frankness, the summary mentions that „during the round-up a few 
suicides occurred, but compared to the large number of the assembled Jews, these were 
negligible." They were not talking about people, but rather about negligible, alien, and 
hostile beings who had to be removed. 
On 10 April, even in the most remote mountain villages, cut off from radio and 
newspapers, the Jews of Kárpátalja learned that they were to establish „Jewish commit-
tees." On this day, Tölgyesy once again gave verbal instructions to the administrative 
authorities, and this time in accordance with the Jewish decrees that had been puring down 
like rain since 29 March, that they are to make public the following: 
„1. No Jew may receive cooking-fat coupons. In case these have already been 
issued for a long period, they are to be revoked. 2. All trade licenses for Jews are to be 
revoked, with the exception of localities where the same trade is not practiced by a 
Christian. 3. Works by Jewish authors must be weed (sic!) out of every library. 4. Stores 
10 OL, ibid.. Géza Halász's notes, 2 April 1944. 
" OL, ibid,. Géza Halász's notes, 4 April 1944. 
12 OL, BM (Ministry of the Interior, — hereinafter: BM) res. K 148. 1200 cs. Summary report of the 
Gendarmerie, 30 May 1944, 8929/B. kl. p. 325. 
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owned by Jews must be marked by a yellow star, or by the conspicuously displayed and 
easily legible words „Jewish store." 5. In every town where Jews reside, Jewish 
committees are to be formed, and these committees will be responsible for the behavior of 
the Jewish population. 6. All persons above the age of six who are classified as Jews must 
display the badge of the yellow star on their outer garments at all times. Failure to comply 
with this order will result in immediate arrest by the Gendarmerie!"13 
On 5 April, Baky, with a „strictly confidential" order, had dispatched the Head 
and entire personnel of the State Security Center's (Államvédelmi Központ = AVK) 
Investigation Department to the VHIth Gendarmerie District, „to prevent possible 
accusations and abuses that may arise later during the solution of the Jewish question." At 
the same time he ordered the AVK Investigation Departmant's Head to „...personally 
supervise, with the help of the Investigation Department's staff, the execution of police 
regulations put in effect against Jews.'"4 
I would like to make clear that the investigators of thé AVK were not called out 
to threaten the Jews. Their main worry was the ownerless, abandoned property that had 
been „left behind." Within too short a time too many Jews were torn from their homes, and 
there were not enough trained people available, neither was there enough time, to officially 
receive the Jews' valuables or to seal all the empty apartments. It was not only the poor, 
and often the not-so-poor of the cities and villages, who covetously eyed the abandoned 
possessions. Baky sent out the AVK detectives to restrain public officials, policemen and 
the Gendarmerie. 
The rounding up of Jews in the VHIth Gendarmerie District was also begun on 
Baky's confidential order 6163/1944, bearing his signature, and issued on 7 April.15 But 
local administrative, police and gendarmerie authorities were unable to comply with certain 
points of the order. Therefore, within his own jurisdiction, and without any hesitation, 
Halász sent off his own instructions, modifying those of the Ministry of the Interior, to all 
the commanders of the Carpatho-Ruthenia Gendarmerie. He claimed that since „Kárpátalja 
is a military zone in which the deployed army may need every available accommodation, 
the above-quoted order from the Ministry of the Interior, concerning the locking and 
sealing of Jewish apartments, cannot be carried out, especially in the light of our experience 
of resettling Jews in 1941, when the population, despite the seals, broke into and robbed 
the abandoned houses..."16 
Géza Halász referred to the Jewish deportation of August 1941. Mostly from 
Carpatho-Ruthenia, but also from some larger towns, they collected all the Jews whose 
13 OL, KKBH.i. K 774—1944, p. 15. Report of the Chief Administrative Officer of Nagyberezna, dated 10 
April 1944, to the head of the Local Administrative Office of Ung, no. 1880/1944. 
M OL, KKBH.i. K 774—1944, p. 26. For the complete text of the Ministry of the Interior's order BM 
6137/1944. VII. res, dated 5 April see: Vádirat a nácizmus ellen (Indicting Nazism) — hereinafter: Vádirat — Vol. 
I, pp. 106—107. Budapest 1958. Eds.: I. BENOSCHOKSKY and E. KARSAI. 
11 For the complete text, see: Vádirat, Vol. I. pp. 124—127. 
16 OL, KKBH.i. k 774—1944,p. 38. The Government Commissioner's directive, no. 162/1944. biz. sz., dated 
13 April, to the wing-commanders of the Gendarmerie. 
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„citizenship was not in order." Altogether about 18.000 people were deported from the 
country. Most of them were butchered by the Nazis and their Ukrainian collaborators in 
Kamenyec-Podolszk. 
On 15 April 1944 the Police Chief of Ungvár held a conference in his office on 
„the subject of executing the Jewish laws." In the record of this conference, called an 
„Official Memorandum", the Chief summed up the essence of Halász's modifying 
instruction: The various valuables confiscated from the Jews are not to be sent the Munkács 
branch of the National Bank, but to the Police Headquarters of Munkács. The Ungvár 
section of the Vlllth Gendamerie District in Kassa was also informed to whom to address 
the shipments: Dr. Lajos Meggyesy, AVK, Attorney, Delivery Committee. Valuables 
meant: money, silver, gold and all other precious metals, gems, savings accounts, bonds, 
securities, typewriters, cameras, and watches. Military materials (meant) 
skis, ski boots, bicycles, binoculars, leather, rubber goods, cars and car equipment. All 
these are to be stored at the station of the Gendarmerie, summed up the head of the Ungvár 
Section of the Gendarmerie. He also noted that valuable textile goods, bolts of fabric and 
linen, quality paintings and rugs (Persian, oriental) are to be handed over to the town's 
council for „storage and safekeeping."17 
If the gendarmes and police would let them, then theoretically, according to the 
already quoted order no. 6163/1944 of the Ministry of the Interior, the Jews would have 
been able to take only the clothes on their backs, one overcoat, at most two sets of 
underwear, food for no more than fourteen days per person, baggage of no more than fifty 
kilograms that would have to include everything, even bedding, blankets, mattresses, etc.18 
In many places however, those in charge would not allow enough time for the 
Jews to pack even their most essential belongings. A lot was left in the abandoned Jewish 
houses which the local population began to plunder. Already on 1 May 1944, quoting his 
order no: 162/1944, Halász sent new instructions to the authorities of Carpatho-Ruthenia. 
He stated that in spite of this order „there have been many instances where possessions 
have been removed from abandoned Jewish houses and apartments, and therefore he 
directed the authorities to carefully gather and guard Jewish possessions. "19 
Following the advice and instructions of German SS officers with long experience 
all over Europe, the rounding up of Jews and confining them in ghettos was carried out by 
Hungarian officials. An interesting episode of this harmonious cooperation tells a great deal 
about the atmosphere in which events took place in the spring of 1944 in Carpatho-
17 OL, KKBH.i. K 774—1944, p. 14. Official Memorandum at the Ungvár police headquarters of ihe 
conference held on 15 April; also: the strictly confidential report of the VHIth (Kassa) Gendermerie District's 
Ungvár section, no. 244/kt. 1944, dated 15 April, to the sub-prefect of Ung. county. OL, Miniszterelnöki Levéltár 
(Archives of the Prime Minister), Északkeleti Hadműveleti Terület Polgári Kormánybiztossága (The Civilian 
Government Commission of the Northeastern Theater of Military Operations) 1944. sz.n., pp. 5—6. 
" Vádirat, I. p. 126. 
19 OL, KKBH.i. K 774—1944, p. 19. Géza Halász's directive, dated 1 May 1944, to the heads of every Local 
Administrative Office, and Orphans' Court, to all Chiefs of County Administrations, District Notaries and Town 
Clerks of Kárpátalja. 
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Ruthénia. At 11 o'clock in the evening of 17 April, the Mayor of Ungvár, Dr. László 
Megay, telephoned the police and told them that an unknown perpetrator, or perpetrators, 
had fired five shots at his apartment and smashed his window. According to the police, Dr. 
László Megay also called Teofil Dannecke (sic!), SS Hauptsturmführer who, referring to 
the murder, also by unknown persons, of a German soldier earlier the same day in the city, 
called the Police Chief of Ungvár and instructed him to round up 100 prominent Jews by 
5 a.m.; he would want to have them executed. Before complying, the Chief of Police 
dispatched investigators to investigate the two reports. It turned out that the murdered 
soldier was in fact a woman of easy virtue who was found by them in the bathroom of a 
German military barracks with a bullet hole in her head. She had a revolver in her left 
hand, but the bullet entered her right temple... As to the Mayor's window: it was smashed 
by stones. Vitéz*** György Thurzó, Police Chief, made his report to the proper authori-
ties; the SS officer then told him that he did not insist on executing the 100 Jews since he 
was stationed there only as an „observer and advisor" anyway. Incidentally, SS 
Hauptsturmführer Theodor Dannecker (that was his real name) had already made that 
statement at a meeting held in the Mayor of Ungvár's office on the morning of 17 April... 
As a point of interest, Theodor Dannecker was a member of Adolf Eichmann's staff and 
played a significant role in the „settling" of the Bulgarian Jewish question. With his 
assistance 4,150 Thracian and 7,144 Macedonian Jews were deported to the Treblinka 
concentration camp where most of them perished.20 
On 23 April Edmund Veesenmayer reported with satisfaction that: 
„The ghettoization in the Kárpát area began on 16 April.***5" They have already detained 
150.000 Jews... Negotiations about transportation are underway, and starting on 15 May 
we plan the shipment of 3.000 Jews per day, mostly from Kárpátalja... Destination 
Auschwitz. "2I 
In the most important part of his report, Edmund Veesenmayer called the attention 
of his superior in Berlin to the following fact: 
„In order to avoid endangering the execution of our operation, it would seem 
expedient that the 50.000 Jews in forced labor battalions, which I have requested and the 
government has promised, be directed somewhat farther away from the area of 
Budapest."22 
We must understand well what the Reich's plenipotentiary in Hungary was saying: 
It was much more important to deport the Jewish elderly and babies, the lame, and even 
"" (Order of valor) 
20 OL, KKBH.i. K 774—1944, p. 13. The report of Ungvár's Chief of Police, dated 18 April 1944. About 
Th. Dannecker, see R. L. BRAHAM'S article: „A csatlós államok és az antiszemitizmus" (The Satellite Countries 
and Anti-Semitism) (Világosság, 1990, n. 12, p. 921.) 
**** According to the Gendarmerie report quoted in Note n. 12, ghettoization in the Vlllth Gendarmerie district 
was begun on 15 April. The lack of primary archival sources makes the settling of this contradiction in dates 
impossible. 
21 Veesenmayer's report of 23 April 1944 to the Foreign Ministry. (Wilhelmstrasse, p. 836.) 
22 Ibid. 
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the mentally ill of Carpatho-Ruthenia than the already assembled Jewish inmates of forced 
labor camps who could be well used in the German war industry. 
In a telegram sent on 18 April, the head of the foster home in Munkács asked the 
government's representative in Carpatho-Ruthenia what should happen to Jewish children 
placed with Jewish foster parents; whether they should be taken back into the care of the 
state or along with their foster parents, should they be sent to the camps? There could have 
been no doubt about the reply: the „final destination" of these Jewish orphans was also 
Auschwitz.23 
Until 15 May the main concern — for the authorities — consisted of the feeding 
and the solution of health, especially epidemiological problems, of the Jews now herded 
together in large numbers. It was quite easy to herd together the obedient and frightened 
multitude. Guarding them was not difficult either; they did not try hard to escape. On the 
contrary, there were places where the Jews were guarding themselves. At least this is what 
we learn from the morning report for 19 April 1944 of the assistant commander of the 
collection camp at Ungvár. The report tells us that in this camp of 40.000 square meters, 
only 12 guards were on duty. They would have to keep an eye on 6.152 Jews. There was 
no fence or wall; it would not have been difficult to escape at night between the guards 
positioned at every 300 or 400 meters. The report speaks of the possibility of „mass 
escape, nay, breakout." But „naturally," nothing like that had happened. According to the 
report, „the mood of the detainees is generally satisfactory, reassuring. The delivery and 
reception of the detainees is progressing smoothly. There are no disturbances. To establish 
order within the camp, 100 Jewish police have been press (sic!) into service," writes 
Károly Oszényi, Inspector of the Hungarian Royal Police, Assistant Commander of the 
Jewish collection camp at Ungvár.24 
In the collection camps, „organized" in brick factories and lumber yards, the 
mayor concern was the solution of health/epidemic problems. On 18 April the military 
physician of Ungvár inspected the Jewish collection camp in Felszabadulás Street along with 
his colleagues. He stated in his report that in the collection camp planned for 20.000 
people, one-and-a-half liters of drinking and cooking water and five liters of water needed 
for washing should be provided for each person per day. The camp's two latrines are 
insufficient even for the current population (appr. 4.000 people), concluded Dr. Károly 
Biringer, military physician, referring to the fact that the weight of per capita daily 
excrement is approximately 130 grams, and the volume of urine is 1.200 cm3. To prevent 
contagion, the epidemic of typhoid fever, Dr. Károly Biringer asked that 30.000 liters of 
drinking and 10.000 liters of washing water be secured daily, as well as 15.000 cm3 of 
vaccine with the appropriate number of syringes be supplied.25 
23 OL, KKBH.i. K 774—1944, p. 42. Telegram sent by the principal of the foster home in Munkács, dated 
18 April, to the Government Commissioner of Kárpátalja in Ungvár. 
24 OL, KKBH.i. K 774—1944, p. 86. Morning report of the Assistant Commander of the collection camp at 
Ungvár, for 19 April 1944, no. 169/11 — 1944 biz. sz., sent to police headquarters at Ungvár. 
21 OL, KKBH.i. K 7 7 4 - 1 9 4 4 , pp. 76—77. Report n. 217/lül 1944 of Dr. Károly Biringer, military physician, 
dated 18 April, to the Mayor of Ungvár. 
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„Naturally" these rational requests could be satisfied only in part by the Mayor. As we 
learn from his report to the Minister of the Interior, at Dr. László Megay's instruction the 
city's watermain was equipped with a 1.000 meter long pump suction pipe that allowed the 
supply of 300 liters of water per minute to the camp. However, the most serious problem 
was still not solved. Dr. László Megay wrote to Jaross: 
„... the camp has no sewer system and the daily excreta of 20.000 people cannot 
be disposed of. There is no lime in the city, hence disinfection is impossible. Since the 
warm weather is here, the city's Christian population is greatly disturbed that presently an 
epidemic might break out in the camp that could infect the entire city area and there would 
be no human power to prevent it from spreading." 
„I respectfully request that your Excellency take urgent steps so that the Jews, 
collected and now kept at Ungvár, be taken away as soon as possible. 
It is unlikely that the conditions in the Ungvár ghetto were unusual; according to 
testimony from other sources and from recollections, they represented rather the average 
hell. 
In the middle of April 1944, when they began to round up the Jews of Carpatho-
Ruthenia, the German and Hungarian „appropriate authorities" did not exactly know when 
they would deport these people from the country. Dieter Wisliceny, Adolf Eichniann's right 
hand man, who had already „distinguished himself' in 1943 in settling the Jewish question 
in Slovakia, at a meeting held at Ungvár on 15 April, was able to tell the Hungarians in 
charge only that „in all likelihood" the Jews in the brick factory in Felszabadulás Street will 
remain there for 30 to 45 days.27 
The removal of the Jews was prevented not by the lack of the Germans' „readiness 
to receive them," but by the lack of available transportation. At the beginning of May the 
RSHA, i.e. the Reich Security Main Office, informed the German Foreign Ministry that 
on 4 and 5 May there would be a „timetable conference" in Vienna whose results would 
be conveyed to the Hungarian authorities as well. Organizing the „timetable" of trains 
transporting and deporting the Jews caused no small headache. A German Foreign Ministry 
report at the time calls attention to three serious problems: „For military reasons, use of 
the railway through Lemberg is limited; shipments cannot be sent on the Budapest—Vienna 
line because we want to avoid alarming the Jews of Budapest; the embassy in Bratislava 
considers transports via Slovakia to be risky."28 
The final timetable for the deportation of the Jews of Carpatho-Ruthenia was given 
to the local Hungarian authorities in Munkács on 12 May by Gend.Lt.Col. László 
Ferenczy. In his capacity as Gendarmerie officer in charge of ensuring the cooperation of 
German and Hungarian authorities, particularly in the area of „settling" the Jewish 
26 OL, KKBH.i. K 774—1944, p. 79. The Mayor of Ungvár's petition, n. 112. eln./1944, dated 24 April, to 
the Minister of the Interior. 
27 OL, KKBH.i. K 7 7 4 - 1 9 4 4 , p. 14. Official Reminder of the conference held at the police heaquarters of 
Ungváron 15 April, 1944. 
28 Telegram of Ehrenlal von Thadden, sent to the German Embassy in Budapest on 5 May 1944. 
(Wilhelmslrasse, p. 841.) 
question, László Ferenczy announced that the Jews, except for foreign citizens, were to be 
taken out of the country; the first transport was to leave on 14 May. One hundred ten trains 
were to take the Jews to Kassa where the German police would take them over. The 
markings on the trains were to read: DA-Umsiedler (resettlers): Removal of German 
laborers. One train (45 freightcars) was to carry 3.000 people, each freightcar on the 
average holding 70 people and their baggage. Severely ill Jews and their relatives were to 
go with the last group. The Mayor was to supply bread for two days, this meant 400 grams 
per person for the two days. Coffee or water was also to be provided. Gend. Captain Dr. 
László Uray, one of the participants at the conference, noted: 
„...if necessary, 100 people may go in one car. They can be packed in like 
herrings, since the Germans need hardy people, those who can't take it will drop. There 
is no need for dandies in Germany. "29 
Gend.Lt.Col. László Ferenczy failed in his attempt to exempt Jews of foreign 
nationality from deportation. As a contemporary German summary report wrote: „The local 
commanders of the Hungarian Gendarmerie... demonstrate such extreme zeal, that they 
consider this to be a question of honor; if at all possible, they wish to report no foreigners 
present. n3° 
Although it may seem strange at first glance, in the matter of foreigners even the 
Germans had failed to control the Hungarian authorities. On 3 May 1944 Prime Minister 
Sztójay informed the members of his government that in early April a high-ranking SS 
officer had visited the Ministry of the Interior and tried to convince the Hungarian 
authorities to treat foreigners, (Jews and non-Jews) as the Germans had. Special attention 
was called to the various ways of „handling" citizens of neutral countries and those of 
belligerent states, i.e. at war with the Axis powers. In Germany, for example, American 
and British women and children were not interned. Of course, this was true only of non-
Jewish women and children. On the other hand, in Hungary, as we learn from the protests 
that were received at the Foreign Ministry, not only citizens of enemy countries, but — in 
the countryside and in the capital as well — citizens of neutral countries were detained, 
some in their homes, some at the KEOKH (Central National Office for the Supervision of 
Foreigners), and were sent to collection camps. As Döme Sztójay remarked: „In their 
protests, foreign embassies took paricular exception to the removal of citizens of enemy 
countries to places (Csepel) where they would be in danger of being bombed."31 In this 
matter the Germans had one motivation: They asked, indeed demanded (in vain!) from the 
Hungarian authorities more sensitivity and caution regarding foreigners (Jews and non-
Jews) because they feared retaliation against German citizens living abroad. Still, the 
Ministry of the Interior's order of 3 May calling for the separation of foreign and stateless 
29 Minutes of a meeting held in Munkács on 12 May 1944, recorded by the Mayor of Nagybánya, no. i. 
34/1944 eln. The complete text of the minutes was published in R. L. BRAHAM's The Politics of Genocide. New 
York, 1981., Vol. II, pp. 6 0 1 - 6 0 3 . 
30 Thadden's 26 May 1944 report to the Foreign Ministry. (Wilhelmstrasse, p. 855.) 
11 Minutes of the Cabinet's session of 3 May 1944; for the portions dealing with Jews see: Vádirat, Vol. I. 
pp. 2 8 6 - 2 8 9 . 
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Jews, was not heeded.32 Adolf Hezinger, one of Edmund Veesenmayer's colleagues, on 
his random inspection tour of Jewish camps and ghettos in May 1944, found a large 
number of foreign Jews there.33 
On 21 May Ferenczy reported from Munkács that 94.667 Jews had been taken 
away on 29 trains from the area of the Vlllth, IXth, and Xth Gendarmerie Districts 
(Felvidék, Kárpátalja (Carpatho-Ruthenia), and Észak-Erdély (North Transylvania) by that 
date. 
„The empty trains arriving from the Reich", László Ferenczy noted, „are 
positioned on the departure tracks one day before leaving. As a result, loading follows the 
timetable; departures and the trips to the border have thus far passed without a hitch."34 
We also learn from Von Thadden's report, already mentioned above, that about 
one third of the Jews deported were capable of work. The clerk failed to mention that those 
considered unfit were gassed after their arrival in Auschwitz and that their bodies were 
burned in the crematoria.35 
EPILOGUE I 
On 13 June Edmund Veesenmayer sent his final report to Ribbentrop: „The 
transporting of Jews from Kárpátalja and Transylvania was completed on 7 June. All told 
we transported 289.357 Jews to their destination in 92 trains, each consisting of 45 cars. 
The original target number of approximately 310.000 could not be achieved since in the 
interim some of the Jews were called up by the Hungarians for defensive forced labor 
service. "36 
Looking at the accounting, we can see that Ferenczy and Veesenmayer had every 
reason to be satisfied. Since 1938 nowhere had the Nazis and their cohorts ever managed 
to gather so many Jews within such a short period, rob them of their possessions and deport 
them. From Carpatho-Ruthenia and Transylvania, four trains, on the average, left daily for 
Auschwitz with deathly punctuality, with 69.8 persons in each freightcar. Of course some 
cars had more and some had less, but the goal was achieved: The majority of the Jews 
were annihilated in these párts of Hungary, too. 
EPILOGUE II 
The deportation of the Jews did not leave the non-Jewish population unconcerned. 
At the beginning of June 1944, the Investigation Section of Kassa reported that in and 
around Nagyszőlős rumors were circulating that after the Jews the Carpatho-Ruthenians 
would be deported. The Central Investigation Command of the Hungarian Royal 
32 For the complete text of the Ministry of the Interior's decree, no. 7233/1944 VII.res., see: Vádirat, Vol. 
I, pp. 2 9 0 - 2 9 3 . 
33 See Note n. 30. 
34 The originals of László Ferenczy's reports from 1944 are found in the archives of the Ministry of the 
Interior, attached to the records of Ferenczy's trial. 
33 See Note n. 30, pp. 855—856. 
36 Veesenmayer's telegram to Ribbentrop on 13 June 1944. (Wilhelmstrasse, p. 865.) 
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Gendarmerie suggested to the Head of the Public Safety Department of the Ministry of the 
Interior that he „put into effect some informational and counter-propaganda operations."37 
EPILOGUE III 
The Carpatho-Ruthenians' fear was baseless. For the Jews, however, there 
would have been much more reason for fleeing in panic. However, while daily thousands, 
tens of thousands, of their coreligionists were being deported, the Jews of the capital still 
believed that they were not in danger. According to Von Thadden, the Jewish Committee 
informed the Jews that „...the regulations concern only the Jews of the eastern territories 
who, as opposed to other, assimilated Jews, have kipt their Jewish characteristics...Be that 
as it may", Von Thadden added, „whether because of this propaganda or some other 
reason, the Jews of other territories, despite the beginning of the deportations, have been 
calm."38 
37 OL, KKBH.i. K 774—1944, p. 9. A report on the people's mood designated as n. 8950/B:kt. — 1944, 
recorded under 10. 173/1944. VII. res. sz. 
38 See Note n. 30, p. 854. 
Karsai László 
Zsidó deportálások Kárpátalján 1944-ben 
A tanulmány elsősorban eddig még szakemberek előtt is ismeretlen dokumentumok 
segítségével megkísérli összefoglalni a kárpátaljai zsidóság 1944-es deportálásának 
történetét. Az Országos Levéltárban találhatók a Kárpátaljai Kormányzói Biztos Hivatalának 
(KKBH) iratai. Ezt az iratanyagot eddig még senki sem dolgozta föl szisztematikusan, 
annak ellenére, hogy rendkívül sok érdekes és új információt tartalmaz, többek között a 
magyar zsidó Holocaust történetével kapcsolatban is. A tanulmány vázolja a magyar zsidók 
helyzetét 1944 elején, a magyar és német hivatalos zsidópolitika általános kereteit, majd azt 
vizsgálja, hogy milyen körülmények között zajlott Kárpátalján 1944 áprilisában—májusában 
a zsidók megbélyegzése, kifosztása, gettókba, majd gyűjtőtáborokba terelése, végül 
deportálásuk. Bőven idéz a korabeli német diplomáciai iratok mellett az egykorú magyar 
csendőri, tisztiorvosi jelentésekből is. A dokumentumok elemzéséből világosan kiderül, 
hogy a magyar és német hatóságok harmonikusan együttműködtek a zsidókérdés 
„megoldásában", maguk a zsidók pedig képtelenek voltak ellenállást tanúsítani. 
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